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Promises and the Press: First Amendment
Limitations on News Source Recovery for
Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement
INTRODUCTION
Journalists frequently promise news sources confidentiality1 in exchange for information the sources possess.2 Traditionally, both the press 3 and its sources have regarded these
agreements as binding promises. 4 In recent years, however,
journalists have shown an increasing tendency to disregard
such agreements when they believe the public interest demands
publication of the confidential information.5 Sources have responded by seeking a legal remedy for breach of the confidentiality agreement. 6 Recently, a state court accepted a plaintiff
source's argument that a promise of confidentiality given in exchange for information is a legally binding contract.
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Company,7 a Minnesota district
1. A confidentiality agreement consists of a promise by a reporter to a
news source that the reporter either will not publish particular information
provided by that source or that the reporter will not attribute such information to that source in a published story. See infra note 52.
2. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. Although "sources" may
include documents, books, and other objects, this Note uses the word to mean
persons supplying information.
3. This Note uses the terms press and media interchangeably.
4. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
6. Some sources have argued, unsuccessfully, that state laws grantings a
conditional privilege to reporters against forced disclosure in judicial proceedings give sources legal rights. See infra note 72-73 and accompanying text. In
at least three other reported suits, sources have alleged breach of contract. See
infra notes 7-12, 14 and accompanying text.
7. (Hennepin County Dist. Ct., Minn., June 19, 1987), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part,No. C8-88-2631, sl. op. (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1989). The case
arose in Minnesota in 1982 during the gubernatorial campaign between Republican Wheelock Whitney and Democrat Rudy Perpich. Zuckerman, Breaking
the Code of Confidentiality, TIME, Aug. 1, 1988, at 61. Dan Cohen, a wellknown Republican activist with ties to the Whitney campaign, offered to provide documents concerning the election to reporters from the Minneapolis
Star and Tribune, the St. Paul Pioneer Press, the Associated Press, and a television station. All four reporters promised Cohen confidentiality. See Court
Ruling: Wien the PressBreaks a Promise, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1988, § 4, at 7,
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court held two newspapers liable for breach of contract because
they published a source's name in violation of a confidentiality
agreement." The newspapers had breached the agreement 9 because their editors believed the source provided the information in attempting a last-minute campaign smear of a rival
political candidate, making the source's identity newsworthy information. 10 The trial judge found that breach of the confidentiality agreement did not present a first amendment issue,"
and based his jury instructions on the common
law. The jury
12
awarded the plaintiff $700,000 in damages.
col. 1. The documents showed that the Democratic candidate for lieutenant
governor had been arrested for shoplifting 12 years before. Zuckerman, supra,
at 61. The Associated Press ran the story without attribution. Court Ruling,
supra, at 7, col. 1. The television station found the information too trivial and
did not run the story. Id At both newspapers, however, editors overruled objections from the reporters and decided to attribute the information to Cohen.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Alternative Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., Ct. File No. 798806 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct., Minn., Aug. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Defendants' Brief]. Cohen not only had ties to the opposing campaign,
but had documents showing that the shoplifting charge had been vacated, a
fact the papers had discovered and included in their stories. For further discussion of the Cohen case, see articles cited in note 13, infra.
8. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460, 1464
(Knoll, J., denying defendant's motion for summary judgment) (1987). In addition to breach of contract, Cohen alleged the newspaper reporters had misrepresented their authority to grant confidentiality, and that this was an
actionable tort. Id. at 1463. The district court held that the newspapers could
be held liable on the misrepresentation claim as well as on the contract claim.
Id. at 1461-63. See also infra note 12.
9. The plaintiff sucessfully established an agency relationship between
the newspapers and the reporters. Cohen, 14 Media L. Rep. at 1463. Under
general agency principles, an agent's act, if authorized by the principal, constitutes an act of the principal. See Mackenzie v. Ryan, 230 Minn. 378, 41 N.W.2d
878 (1950). The defendant newspapers argued that the reporters did not have
authority to make binding confidentiality agreements on behalf of the newspaper, but the jury necessarily rejected that argument in finding the newspapers
liable. Cohen, 14 Media L. Rep. at 1463. This Note assumes that normal
agency principles govern the relationship between reporters and their employers and that the act of granting confidentiality will be imputed to the reporter's employer.
10. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 7, at 19-30.
11. Before trial, the judge ruled that "It]his is not a case about free
speech, rather it is one about contracts and misrepresentation." Cohen, 14 Media L. Rep. at 1464.
12. The award consisted of $200,000 in actual damages and $500,000 in punitive damages, based on both the contract and misrepresentation causes of action. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2288, 2288
(1988) (denying defendant's motion for new trial or J.N.O.V.). A divided panel
of the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed liability on the contract claim, but
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The Cohen case garnered national attention 13 as the first
case in which a news source successfully sued a media organization for breaching a confidentiality agreement. 14 Commentators noted that this groundbreaking application of contract
law1 5 could have far-reaching consequences for the way reportfound no liability on the misrepresentation claim. See Cohen v. Cowles Media
Company, No. C8-88-2631, sl. op. at 29-30 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1989).
13. See, e.g., Sitomer, Is Reporter's Word a Contract?, Christian Science
Monitor, Sept. 1, 1988, at 17; Zuckerman, supra note 7, at 61; The Region: Court
Ruling; When the Press Breaks a Promise, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1988, § 4, at 7,
col. 1; Two Newspapers Lose Suit for Disclosing Source, N.Y. Times, July 23,
1988, § 1, at 6, col. 5; Papers Ordered to Pay $700,000 For Naming Source, L.A.

Times, July 23, 1988, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
The case received such considerable attention because it raised novel
legal and ethical questions. Langley & Levine, Broken Promises, COLUM.
JOURNALIsM REv., July/Aug. 1988, at 21,22. The case presented a direct conflict between the ethical obligation to keep promises and the media's commitment to informing the public.
14. At least three other cases have presented similar causes of action. See
Doe v. American Broadcasting Co., 16 Media L. Rep. 1658 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989); Reporteron Trial in Suit for Release of Source's Name, 97 L.A. Daily J.,
March 15, 1984, at 1, col. 1. In Fries v. National BroadcastingCo., No. 456687
(Super. Ct. Cal. 1982), the plaintiff alleged breach of an oral contract of confidentiality, as well as misrepresentation. According to the plaintiff, a reporter
had promised him confidentiality, but had broken the agreement by identifying the plaintiff as a source to the plaintiff's co-workers. In pre-trial motions,
the judge ruled that the agreement fell under the California statute protecting
reporter-source communications. The judge ruled that the effect of the statute
was to require that the plaintiff prove the media defendant breached the contract with "wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences" to the source.
See Trial Brief for Defendants and Cross Complainants, Fries v. National
BroadcastingCo., (Super. Ct. Cal. 1982) (No. 456687). The first trial resulted in
a hung jury, and the case settled before the second trial began. See M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW, CASES & MATERIALS 589 (3d ed. 1987). In Doe v. American BroadcastingCo., the appellate court implicitly recognized the validity of
the plaintiff's cause of action by affirming the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 16 Media L. Rep. at 1659. A third
case is currently pending involving a breach of contract claim by a source allegedly promised confidentiality against Glamour magazine. See Minnesota
Maverick Targets Liberals and the Press, AM. LAW. 125 (Sept. 1989).
15. The Cohen case involved both a breach of contract claim and a tort
claim for misrepresentation. See supra note 8. This Note will not consider the
claim for misrepresentation. The gravamen of that claim is that the reporters
never intended to honor the promise of confidentiality, and plaintiffs
presented the newspapers' breach of the agreement as proof of that claim. See
Defendants' Brief, supra note 7, at 19-28 (arguing no evidence existed to support claim that defendants never intended to perform as promised). The misrepresentation claim thus rides piggy-back on the contract claim; without the
breach of contract, there would be no damages from any alleged misrepresentation. The heart of the case therefore lies in the court's finding of liability for
the contract breach. Nevertheless, because many states, including Minnesota,
disallow punitive damages for a contract breach unless it is accompanied by an
independent tort, see Bar/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46 (Minn.
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ers collect the news and for what the press ultimately publishes' 6 and predicted that an increasing number of sources will
bring actions for breach of confidentiality contracts. 17 When
the press publishes newsworthy information in breach of confidentiality agreements, such actions create an acute tension between the need to redress injury and the first amendment's
guarantee of freedom of the press. I8
1983), collateral torts such as misrepresentation can be powerful causes of action, as the award of $500,000 in punitive damages in Cohen demonstrates, see
supra note 12.
16. First amendment expert Floyd Abrams stated: "If not reversed, this
decision opens the door for an enormous range of real or imagined sources to
claim that, in one way or another, they've been victimized by [the] press."
N.Y. Times, July 23, 1988, § 1, at 6, col. 5. Media lawyer Greg Pruitt warned
that "[m]aking a reporter-source relationship a simple contract gives those
who want to sue the press a new way to circumvent constitutional protections." N.Y. Times, July 24, 1988, § 1, at 14, col. 4. Also disturbing is the power
this cause of action gives to public officials-who frequently act as veiled
sources-to punish the press during periods of heightened tension between the
government and the press. Langley & Levine, supra note 13, at 24. Officials
could use the threat of litigation to extract press concessions, or to persuade
reporters to put the "spin" officials desire on stories. See also Newspaper in
New Case Over Naming Source, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1988, § 1, at 14, col. 4. A
source quoted in a story claimed a reporter had promised her confidentiality.
Id Because editors could not determine immediately whether the source had
been promised confidentiality, they decided to destroy 625,000 copies of the
Sunday magazine supplement waiting for delivery at distribution centers
around the state rather than risk a lawsuit. Id.; Zuckerman, supra note 7, at
61.
17. Even before the jury had returned its verdict in the Cohen case, the
Star and Tribune was threatened with a fresh breach of contract suit over an
article it planned to run. See also Johnson, Punishing the Press, Minn. L.J.,
Sept. 1988, at 20 (interview with attorney Paul Hannah); cf New Yorker in the
Fray On Journalism and Ethics, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1989, § 1, at 7, col. 1
(national edition). First amendment attorney Floyd Abrams noted:
The most powerful people in society would leap to the chance to sue
reporters if they did not have to prove falsity and defamation .... If
all they have to show is that a reporter tried to persuade a source to
give him information by suggesting that he felt a certain way and
then wrote his story differently, the courthouse will be filled with
lawsuits.
Id; see also infra note 133 (discussing other potential breach-of-contract
actions against media).
18. The tension is especially acute because both first amendment freedoms and the freedom to contract are deeply rooted principles in the social
and legal fabric of the United States. One court has declared that "[t]he right
to contract freely with the expectation that the contract shall endure according to its terms is as fundamental to our society as the right to write and to
speak without restraint." Blount v. Smith, 12 Ohio St. 2d 41, 47, 231 N.E.2d
301, 305 (1967); see also infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing
value of free press); cf Note, The Right of the Public and the Press to Gather
Information,87 HARV. L. REv. 1505, 1516 n.62 (suggesting that private interest
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This Note seeks to reconcile the media's first amendment
interests with the interests of sources who claim they are
harmed by a media organization's alleged breach of a confidentiality contract. 19 Part I examines the role of the press, the
constitutional protection for the press, and the relationship between a reporter and a source. Part I also reviews the operation of contract law. Part II discusses the tension between a
breach-of-contract action and the first amendment, and concludes that courts must balance the competing interests involved. In addition, Part II identifies considerations relevant to
developing a standard to balance these interests. Part III proposes that courts apply a two-part constitutional standard to resolve a source's claim against a media entity for breach of a
confidentiality agreement. Part III also explains how the proposed standard protects the competing interests, how a court
might apply the standard to the facts of the Cohen case, and addresses possible criticisms of the proposed standard.
I. THE PRESS, CONTRACT LAW, AND FIRST
AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE PRESS
The notion that the first amendment occupies a preferred
position in the United States constitutional system lies at the
core of the Supreme Court's protection of free speech and the
press. 20 Any abridgement of speech or press-any substantial

chilling effect on activities covered by the first amendmenttriggers constitutional protection.2 1 That protection, however,
is not absolute. The extent of protection for a given activity depends on the strength of the particular first amendment value
in protecting information against public disclosure is directly antagonistic to
goal of free flow of information).
19. This Note assumes courts will find that a confidentiality agreement in
which a reporter promises anonymity or promises not to publish information
given as background material in exchange for information is a valid contract.
Disclosures of sources by means other than publishing are beyond the
scope of this Note. The Note is not directly concerned with press disclosure of
sources in judicial proceedings, for example. If courts hold that a reporter's
promise of confidentiality given in exchange for information is a valid contract, as this Note assumes they will, then the question of what liability attaches to a media entity that breaches such a contract pursuant to a judicial
order will become an important one.
20. See Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 422, 441 (1980).

21. Id. at 453-54.
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at issue and the nature of the competing interests involved.22
1. The Role of the Press
The Supreme Court has identified three principal functions
served by the press in the United States constitutional scheme.
First, the press serves as a vehicle and conduit for individual
expression. 23 This function involves persona rights and is
linked to a reading of the first amendment as protecting individual autonomy. 24 In addition, the media play a role in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and
providing a forum for debate and discussion. 25 That function
springs from a self-government theory of the first amendment,2 6 according to which the press is protected because it supplies members of the public with the diverse information they
need to exercise their democratic sovereignty.2 7 Finally, the
22. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985Y (weighing first amendment values against state interest in protecting reputation to determine extent of constitutional protection).
23. Note, supra note 18, at 1507-16.
24. The "personal right" theory views freedom of the press as an individual right, and was the dominant doctrine for many years. Lewis, A Preferred
Positionfor Journalism?,7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 626 (1979); see, e.g., Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (holding freedom of press is personal right and
liberty). The theory was tied closely to a reading of the first amendment's
speech and press clauses as synonymous. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Gradually, the Supreme Court began to view the press as serving societal ends apart
from the individual's personal interest in publishing. See infra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text. The Court has not abandoned the "personal right" theory
of the role of the press, however. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(defending newspaper's complete discretion in selecting subject matter for
publication as absolute right); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972)
(quoting Lovell, 303 U.S. at 450, 452) (stating freedom of press is fundamental
personal right not confined to newspapers and periodicals).
25. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1977) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)); see also Grossjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1935) (noting "that an untrammeled press [is] a
vital source of public information"). Justice Frankfurter's succinct statement
of this view reveals the fundamental tension between it and the "personal
right" approach: "Freedom of the press... is not an end in itself but a means
to the end of a free society." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354-55 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Even Frankfurter, however, was not willing to
abandon the personal right theory as a separate conceptualization of the
press's role, noting that freedom of the press "is no greater than the liberty of
every citizen of the Republic." 1d. at 364.
26. See Nimmer, Introduction-IsFreedom of Press a Redundancy: What
Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 639, 653 (1975).
27. See Cox Broadcasting v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1974) (stating that
"without the information provided by the press most of us ...would be unable
to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of govern-
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press serves as a check on governmient power, assuring that the
government is accountable to the people.28 This conception of
the press as a check on government also derives from the selfgovernment theory, but focuses on the structure of the press as
protecting the people's sovereignty, rather than on the content
of the information conveyed. 29
2.

First Amendment Doctrine and the Press

The first amendment protects media entities' peformance
of their constitutionally recognized roles. The Supreme Court
has held that the first amendment protects both newsgathering3 ° and publication activities 31 of the press. The Court accords more protection to publication, however, because it
ment generally."). De Tocqueville long ago recognized the crucial link between the press and sovereignty: "When the right of every citizen to a share in
the government of society is acknowledged, everyone must be presumed to be
able to choose between ... various opinions .... The sovereignty of the people
and the liberty of the press may therefore be regarded as correlative .... "A.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1980 (1845) quoted in O'Brien, The
FirstAmendment and the Public's "Right to Know", 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
579, 590 n.52 (1980).
28. See Mills v. Alabama, 304 U.S. 214 (1966). The Mills Court stated:
"The press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen
means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people
.... " Id. at 219; see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that Constitution protects press so
it can "bare the secrets of government and inform the people"). Justice Stewart asserted that this checking function was the role of the press primarily
protected by the constitution. See Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
631, 634 (1975) (stating that "[t]he primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was.., to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official branches"). For a
comprehensive analysis of the checking function of the press, see Blasi, The
Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 523.
Blasi argues that the press checks government through its ability to expose
abuses of government power and to arouse the people to react against those
abuses. 1d. at 605.
29. See Address by Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, S.I. Newhouse Center for Law & Justice (Oct. 17, 1979), reprintedin 32 RUTGERS L.
REV. 175, 176-77 (1980).
30. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707 (1972) (recognizing
that newsgathering is constitutionally protected). The Court stated that
"without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
would be eviscerated." Id. at 681. Branzburg marked the first time the
Supreme Court recognized a constitutional protection for newsgathering. The
Court found no newsgathering privilege, however, for reporters to withhold
identities of confidential sources from grand juries.
31. This Note most directly concerns the press publication function, see
infra note 32, although newsgathering also is implicated.
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directly implicates the principal roles of the press in the consti32
tutional scheme.
Early first amendment decisions focused on direct governmental infringement of first amendment rights, such as
preventing a speaker from addressing an audience3 3 or preventing a newspaper from publishing a story.3 4 In recent times,
however, the Supreme Court has become sensitive to the chilling effect private common-law causes of action can have on the
exercise of free speech and press rights.
In 1964, in New York Times v. Sullivan,35 the Supreme

Court held that judicial enforcement of common-law rules imposing strict liability for defamation 36 violates the first amendment by inhibiting open and robust debate.3 7 The Court thus
"constitutionalized" defamation law38 to prevent the threat of
adverse defamation judgments,3 9 or even the need to defend
32. The Court has provided nearly absolute protection against prior restraints on what media entities may publish. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (denying government's request to enjoin publication of Pentagon Papers). The Court also has provided
considerable protection for the press in cases involving punishment after publication of a story. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (striking down criminal conviction under statute prohibiting dissemination of names of judges investigated in confidential proceedings
of state commission).
33. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) (reversing conviction of speaker under state breach-of-peace statute).
34. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931).
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the city commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama had sued the newspaper and several others over a
newspaper advertisement calling attention to racial inequities and violence
against blacks in Montgomery. Id. at 256-59.
36. Under the common law of defamation, an individual incurred liability
by publishing written or spoken material tending "so to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community." RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 559 (1938). One who published material that was both false and
defamatory was strictly liable for damages, even without proof of actual harm.
Id.
37. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
38. For almost two hundred years, the common-law tort of defamation existed independent of any first amendment limitations. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, the
Supreme Court had held that defamatory speech was "unprotected" by the
first amendment. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-57 (1952); Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
39. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422,
425 (1975). The Court wrote that the fear of damage awards from defamation
actions may be "markedly more inhibiting [to the free press] than the fear of
prosecution under a criminal statute." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277; see
also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-41 (noting that rule of strict liability that compels
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against such suits, from producing media self-censorship. 40

New York Times and its progeny modify the common-law
treatment of defamatory falsehoods by requiring that public official and public figure plaintiffs prove publishers made defamatory statements with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge
that the statements were false or in reckless disregard of their
truth or falsity.4 1 The real focus of the Times rule, however, is

not on the issue of truth or falsity, but on the actual effect that
42
remedies against false statements have on truthful speech.
The Court's standard seeks to balance the reputation interest
protected by the law of defamation against the public interest
served by an unfettered press. 43 The Court has held in subsequent cases that private figure defamation plaintiffs need not
meet such a high standard of proof.44
The Supreme Court also has held that the first amendment
imposes limitations on other common-law causes of action applied against communicative acts, including actions for invasion
46
of privacy 45 and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
publisher to guarantee accuracy of factual assertions may lead to intolerable
self-censorship).
40. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971)
(plurality).
41. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Saint Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727 (1968). The Court has altered other features of the common-law
defamation rules as well. For instance, the Court has held that the commonlaw rule under which damages are presumed is unconstitutional, except in
cases in which the plaintiff is a private person suing on a matter not of public
concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 U.S. 749,
757-61 (1985). Many common-law rules of defamation remain intact, however,
so that constitutional standards exist alongside with traditional rules. See generally R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 1.02[3]-3.36[5], at 1-6 to 3-86, 8.01[2]8.10[5][6], at 8-3 to 8-37 (1986) (discussing evolution of constitutional standards
and common-law rules in area of defamation).
42. Anderson, supra note 39, at 429.
43. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 576-77 (1980).
44. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). The Court affords more weight to the reputation interest when the plaintiff is a private
person rather than a public official or public figure. See id
45. Four separate causes of action make up the general tort of invasion of
privacy: "false light" invasion of privacy; intrusion on seclusion; wrongful appropriation; and publicity given to private facts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
The false light action provides a remedy against the public attribution of
false, though not necessarily defamatory, characteristics to a person. Id The
Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs must prove "actual malice" within the
meaning of New York Times to recover. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
390-91 (1967).
The tort of intrusion is akin to trespass and protects against offensive information-gathering practices. R. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 10.03[1]. Such ac-

1562

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1553

Those decisions suggest that any common-law rule which operates to infringe first amendment freedoms should be limited by
a constitutional standard that reconciles the interests served by
47
the common-law rule with first amendment interests.
In providing constitutional protection for the press, the
Supreme Court has not articulated whether this protection derives from the first amendment's speech clause, from its press
clause, or from both clauses read together. 48 The Court has implied, however, that the press clause protects either persons or
49
institutions performing the press function.
tions may raise constitutional issues when the press is involved. See, e.g.,
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1973) (modifying injunction intended to curtail intrusive newsgathering activities).
The tort of wrongful appropriation protects property rights in one's name
or likeness against commercial exploitation. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977) (holding television station may be
held liable for airing videotape of entire human cannonball act during newscast); see generally Ellis, Damages and the Privacy Tort: Sketching a "Legal
Profile",64 IowA L. REV. 1111, 1128-33 (1979).
The action for public disclosure of private facts relies on the notion that
certain facts, even if true, are not appropriate for public scrutiny. Ellis, supra,
at 1135. The Court has noted that this tort clashes directly with first amendment values because it punishes the press for publishing truthful information.
See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1974). The Court has declined, however, to articulate constitutional limits on this cause of action. See
id. Lower courts have applied stringent first amendment standards that significantly limit the reach of this branch of privacy law. See, e.g., Gilbert v.
Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (1981) (recovery can be had only in
"extreme case"); Tuglor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 205-06 525 P.2d 984,
987-88 (1974) (applying New York Times actual malice standard to private facts
disclosure case).
46. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988) (holding
public figure plaintiffs had to meet New York Times actual malice standard to
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from magazine
parody).
47. See Van Alstyne, FirstAmendment Limitations on Recovery from the
Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solution", 25 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 793, 817-19 (arguing courts must be vigilant in applying heightened
constitutional standards to new causes of action that threaten first amendment
values); cf. Hustler,108 S. Ct. at 882 (noting normal common-law rules must
give way in area of debate about public figures).
48. See Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional
Privilegefor the InstitutionalPress, 7 HoFSTRA L. REV. 629, 637 (1979). The
Supreme Court never has decided directly whether the press clause affords
the press special protection not provided by the speech clause and not enjoyed
by others in society. Id.
49. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
784 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing rights of institutional media are
same as those of others engaging in same activities).
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SOURCES AND THE OPERATION OF THE FREE PRESS

Maintaining a free flow of information to the public depends on the ability of members of the press to gather information from their sources.50 In the words of Justice Douglas, "[a]
51
reporter is no better than his source of information."
Journalists regularly rely on confidential sources 52 for a
significant amount 5 3 of the information they obtain.5 4 Reliance
on confidential sources has increased over the past twenty
years; 55 today, studies show that eighty percent of national

news magazine articles5 6 and fifty percent of national wire service stories 57 rely on confidential sources.
Commentators have criticized the use of confidential
sources as denying readers the chance to evaluate the credibility of the information presented.5 8 In addition, unnamed
50. Note, supra note 18, at 1524.
51. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 722 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. The term confidential sources refers to sources who supply information to reporters with an understanding that their identity will not be disclosed or linked to the information provided for publication, as well as to
sources who provide background information that is not to be published. See
Osborne, The Reporter's ConfidentialityPrivilege: Updatingthe EmpiricalEvidence After A Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 57, 71

(1985).
53. The seminal study on the relationship between reporters and their
confidential sources, conducted in 1971 by Professor Vincent Blasi, showed
that the average newsperson surveyed relied on confidential sources in between 22.2% and 34.4% of stories. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege:An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 247 (1971). A more recent survey found that
reporters relied on confidential sources in 31.5% of their stories. Osborne,
supra note 52, at 73.
54. See Note, Disclosureof Sources in InternationalReporting,60 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1631, 1636 (1987). In addition to obtaining information directly from
confidential sources, journalists use such sources to verify information received from "on-the-record" sources, to decide which stories to cover, and to
decide what emphasis and context to give printable facts when writing a story.
Blasi, supra note 53, at 296.
55. One reason for this increase is the rise of the "new journalism," which
emphasizes investigative reporting and heightened scrutiny of government by
the press. Osborne, supra note 52, at 60 n.13. The most famous investigative
duo of recent times noted that "without [our confidential sources] there would
have been no Watergate story told by the Washington Post." C. BERNSTEIN &
B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 7 (1974).
56. See Wulfemeyer, How and Why Anonymous Attribution is Used by
Time and Newsweek, 62 JOURNALISM Q. 81, 83 (1985).
57. Brown, Bybee, Wearden & Straughan, Invisible Power: Newspaper
News Sources and the Limits of Diversity, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 32, 52 (1987).
58. See Foreman, Confidential Sources: Testing the Readers' Confidence,
10 Soc. RESP.: Bus., JOURNALISM, L., MED. 24, 24 (1984). Some critics suggest
that the continued overuse of veiled sources might so strain the public's confi-
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sources with their own interests to promote may manipulate
and exploit reporters. 59 Despite these problems, the selected
use of veiled sources is an invaluable aid to the press in per60
forming its informing and checking roles.
Journalists have a long tradition of protecting their confidential sources. 61 Some reporters have served lengthy jail
sentences for contempt of court after refusing to break
promises of confidentiality by revealing their sources.6 2 Journalists have gone to these lengths for three principal reasons.
They fear that if they become known for breaching confidentiality agreements, existing and potential sources will "dry up,"
making their jobs difficult to perform. 63 In addition, reporters
feel a strong ethical and moral commitment to keeping their
dence that it could lead to the complete discrediting of the practice of granting
confidentiality as a journalistic tool. See Bolbach, The Janet Cooke Affair:
JournalismEthics and Confidential Sources, 98 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 82629 (1981). One survey, however, showed that readers accept the practice of relying on unnamed sources and are not concerned over their increasing use.
See Wulfemeyer, supra note 56, at 82.
59. See Blasi, supra note 53, at 242; Fredin, Assessing Sources: Interviewing, Self-Monitoring and Attribution Theory, 61 JOURNALISM Q. 866, 873
(1984); Smyser, There are Sources and Then There are "Sourcerers",5 Soc.
RESP.: JOURNALISM, L., MED. 13, 14 (1979).
60. See Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Free Press: A Comment On Some New Trends and Some Old Theories, 9 HoFsTRA L. REV. 1, 13
(1980); cf. Blasi, supra note 28, at 609 (discussing first amendment implications
of imposing sanctions on government officials who "leak" information to the
press).
61. Day, Shield Laws and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 2 CoMM. L.
1, 3 (1980); see also Marcus, The Reporter'sPrivilege:An Analysis of The Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ.
L. REV. 815, 817 (1983) (discussing well-known examples of journalists' protection of confidential sources).
62. See Note, supra note 54, at 1639. One of the most famous press cases
involved John Peter Zenger, who was jailed in New York in 1734 for refusing
to reveal his information sources. After remaining imprisoned for nine
months, Zenger was tried and acquitted. Marcus, supra note 61, at 817. A
more recent case in which a reporter incurred a lengthy jail sentence and
gained national attention involved New York Times reporter Myron Farber.
See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 281, 394 A.2d 330, 341 (affirming Farber's contempt conviction for his refusal to produce key documents and materials in
murder trial), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
63. Blasi, supra note 53, at 265-67. Blasi found the threat that reporters
might be subpoenaed and forced to divulge the identity of their veiled sources
resulted primarily in "poisoning the atmosphere" of reporter-source relationships rather than in a complete drying up of sources. Id. The Supreme Court
has noted that no conclusive evidence shows that sources dry up due to the
possibility that a reporter may be forced to divulge sources to members of a
grand jury. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694-95 (1972).
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promises of confidentiality.6 4 Finally, journalists fear losing
their independence by appearing to be an investigative arm of
65
the government.
Because of this tradition, courts frequently have confronted
reporters' refusal to disclose confidential sources in judicial proceedings. 66 In Branzburg v. Hayes,67 however, the Supreme
Court refused to create an absolute reporter's privilege from
testifying at a grand jury hearing.68 The Court reasoned that
the common law never has recognized such a privilege, and that
an absolute privilege would jeopardize a defendant's right to a
fair trial.69
Since Branzburg, however, most lower courts nonetheless
have recognized a conditional reporter's privilege in criminal
cases.70 In addition, all federal and nearly all state courts have
64. See Is Reporter's Word a Contract?, Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 1,
1988, at 17, col. 2. The American Newspaper Guild's Code of Ethics states:
"Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential information in court or before judicial or investigative bodies." AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD, CODE OF ETHICS, cited in Comment, Newsman's
Privilege Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment in
Jeopardy,49 TuL. L. REV., 417, 418 n.7 (1975).
65. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 731 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Blasi,
supra note 28, at 599-600, 604 (arguing that checking function of press is impaired if its autonomy from government is compromised or if public believes
its autonomy is compromised); Blasi, supra note 53, at 241, 254 (noting that
reporters' feelings have changed drastically since years when journalists considered opportunity to serve as lead witness in official probe "a mark of distinction, the next best thing to a Pulitzer Prize").
66. See Marcus, supra note 61, at 818. Marcus noted that litigation over
this question has increased sharply in the 1970s and 1980s. Id. at 820.
67. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
68. Id. at 690.
69. Id. Whether courts would recognize a qualified privilege was a hotly
debated issue immediately following Branzburg, due to Justice Powell's
opaque concurring opinion that seemed to suggest the possibility. Id. at 709-10
(Powell, J., concurring). A number of courts found that, because Powell was
the fifth member of a five-member majority, his view controlled the case. See,
e.g., United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Two years later,
Justice Powell wrote that Branzburg recognized that important first amendment protections were implicated when reporters claimed a privilege not to
testify, and that those interests must be balanced against the state interest in
an effective grand jury system. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 859-69 (1974); see generally Marcus, supra note 61, at 821-39 (describing
opinions produced in Branzburg in detail).
70. See, e.g., Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d. 601, 618, 266 N.W.2d 279, 287
(1978). The privilege is qualified in that other, more important, interests can
defeat it; courts must balance the interest in freedom of the press against the
interest in the information sought. See id. (applying balancing test to reporter's privilege claim in criminal trial).
In both criminal and civil cases, most courts examine three elements in

1566

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1553

recognized such a constitutional privilege in civil cases.7 1 Finally, many state legislatures have enacted so-called "shield
laws" that protect confidential communications between journalists and sources with a qualified privilege. 72 Courts have
made clear, however, that the purpose of the privilege is to pro73
tect the flow of information, rather than to protect sources.
Notwithstanding judicial and legislative recognition of conditional privileges, reporters do not always choose to protect
their confidential sources. Reporters' battles to shield sources
have received public and judicial attention, but when sources
are revealed, it is usually done with little accompanying fan75
fare.74 Media exposure of confidential sources is on the rise.
Increasingly, some members of the press are concluding that
disclosure of selected information about the identities of
sources who were promised confidentiality is in the public
76
interest.
balancing the interest: the relevance of the information to the case, the compelling need for the information, and the unavailability of the information
from other sources less chilling to the first amendment. See, e.g., United
States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982). One court characterized this process as the "balancing of two vital considerations: protection of the
public by exacting the truth versus protection of the public through maintenance of free press." United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir.
1976).
71. See Marcus, supra note 61, at 850-51, 856; Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 96 F.R.D. 10, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1982).
72. Twenty-six states have enacted shield laws that offer various degrees
of protection for journalists. See Marcus, supra note 61, at 859-60 n.323; see,
e.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28 945(1) (1978); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021-.025 (1988).
73. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Boiardo, 83 N.J. 350, 361, 416 A.2d 793, 798
(1980) (holding reporter's privilege belongs only to reporter, not to source).
74. Media attorney Rex Heinke aptly remarked that exposure of confidential sources "isn't reported in [judicial] decisions. It just happens." Remarks of Rex Heinke, quoted in Langley & Levine, supra note 13, at 21.
75. See Langley & Levine, supra note 13, at 21.
76. Id. Two examples illustrate this trend. Shortly after Oliver North
testified during the Iran-Contra hearings that "leaks" had led to publication of
information about the Achille Lauro hijacking incident, Newsweek broke its
pledge of confidentiality to North by revealing that it was North himself who
had leaked the information to the press in exchange for anonymity. Id.
In 1977, a reporter promised Presidential Press Secretary Jody Powell
confidentiality in exchange for damaging information concerning Senator
Charles Percy. The reporter checked the information, found it to be absolutely false, and then broke his promise by writing a story about how Powell
had passed along erroneous information to smear Senator Percy. Smyser,
supra note 59, at 17-18.
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CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

When a reporter promises a source confidentiality in exchange for information, the elements of a legally enforceable
contract usually are present.7 7 Contract law is premised on
78
strict liability; courts give remedies without regard to fault.
To prevail on a contract claim, an aggrieved party normally
must show only that the elements of a contract existed and that
the other party breached the agreement. 79 Absent any legally
recognized defenses,8 0 the defendant is liable for breaching the
terms of the agreement.8 1
Contract theory vindicates individual interests, allowing
parties to exercise personal autonomy in making enforceable
agreements.8 2 Contract theory also promotes society's interests
in encouraging socially useful agreements, while discouraging
83
agreements that are not socially useful by not enforcing them.
Before Cohen,8 4 only one other court had considered
whether a confidentiality agreement between a reporter and a
77. The three elements of a valid contract are offer, acceptance, and consideration. See J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §§ 16, 18 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
A fourth element is implied; the parties must have intended legal consequences to attach to their agreement, and courts use an objective test to determine whether the manifestations made by the parties would demonstrate the
requisite intention to a reasonable person. Id. § 20.
A source's request for confidentiality constitutes an offer. A reporter's
acceptance of this condition constitutes acceptance. The consideration flowing
from the reporter is the reporter's promise of confidentiality, and the consideration flowing from the source is the information imparted to the reporter.
78. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 842 (1982); Freidman, On the
Nature of Contract, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 627, 648 (1983).
79. Any failure to perform as promised constitutes a breach. H. HUNTER,
MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS--BREACH AND REMEDIES § 2.01 (1986).
80. Such defenses include lack of capacity to contract, duress, mistake,
failure to comply with the statute of frauds, illegality, failure of a condition,
impossibility or impracticability of performance, and unconscionabiity. See J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 8-1 to 8-17, 9-2 to 9-8, 9.25
to 9-30, 9-37 to 9-40, 11-16 to 11-26, 13-1 to 13-28, 19-1 to 19-39, 22-1 to 22-9 (3d
ed. 1987).
81. The purpose of remedies for breach of contract conventionally is characterized as compensation of the victim for the injury resulting from the
breach. Cooter & Eisenberg, Damagesfor Breach of Contract,73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1434, 1434 (1985). Because specific performance is disfavored, the remedy
almost always will be money damages. See H. HUNTER, supra note 79, §§ 7-2,
7-3.
82. See H. HUNTER, supra note 79, § 1-01.
83. Cf. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements:
Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 163, 164-65 n.6 (1985) (arguing that state preserves right to regulate private agreements to protect interests of all citizens).
84. See supra note 7.
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source was a valid contract.8 5 Both reporters and sources have
assumed that such agreements are ethically binding based on
mutual trust, although they may not be legally binding contracts.85 Because of the important and sometimes conflicting
interests at stake between reporters and their sources, however, disputes between them inevitably arise, and sources have
begun to call on courts to enforce their agreements.8 7 Such actions require courts to balance the competing free press interests of reporters against the sources' interests in keeping their
identities shielded.
II. THE BASIC TENSION BETWEEN BREACH OF
CONTRACT ACTIONS BY SOURCES AND THE
INTERESTS OF A FREE PRESS:
DEVELOPING A STANDARD
A.

THE NEED TO BALANCE INTERESTS

The functions of the press are to gather information from
news sources, to analyze and interpret that information, and to
publish it for the benefit of the public.8 Confidentiality agreements generally assist the press in performing those func85. That case, Fries v. National BroadcastingCo., No. 456687 (Super. Ct.
Cal. 1982), never reached a judgment. See supra note 14.
86. Cf. Sitomer, supra note 13, at 17.
87. Langley & Levine, supra note 13, at 23. Courts recently have become
receptive to actions alleging breach of a confidential relationship involving a
wrongful disclosure of information. See generallyNote, Breach of Confidence:
An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982). Courts have found liability
mostly in doctor-patient and bank-customer relationships in which the doctor
or the bank wrongfully disclosed sensitive information supplied by the patient
or customer. Id& at 1431. These courts have based liability in such cases on
three theories: invasion of privacy; implied contract; and tortious breach of
confidence. Id. at 1437. See also Comment, Breach of Confidence-The Need
for a New Tort-Watts v. Cumberland County Hospital Syst., 8 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 145 (1985) (arguing for development of separate breach-of-contract tort in
North Carolina).
None of these cases involved reporter-source confidentiality agreements,
however, and at least one commentator has argued that the breach-of-confidence theory would not be an appropriate basis for resolution of cases involving breaches of such agreements. Note, supra, at 1462. The commentator
noted that the tort of breach-of-confidence would involve a "potentially 'chilling' factual determination of exactly what assurances the journalist gave." Id
Furthermore, the breach-of-confidence cases to date recognize a privilege for
disclosures in the public interest, which could encompass disclosures made in
the interests of the public's right to know information, thus precluding recovery by sources. 1d.
88. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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tions.8 9 Reporter-source agreements also allow sources to
convey newsworthy information with some assurance either
that their identities will not become public, or that information
intended only as background for journalists will not be published.90 Sources legitimately expect that journalists will honor
their agreements, and reporters are subject to both ethical 9 '
and practical 92 pressures to keep their promises of
confidentiality.
Confidentiality agreements, however, also restrain the editorial freedom of media entities to publish what they have
learned, by limiting their discretion to disclose either the identity of sources or the information given to reporters on condition it not be published. This restraint is self-imposed to the
extent that members of the press voluntarily promise not to
disclose certain information.
From the source's perspective, courts ought to enforce a
confidentiality agreement that satisfies all the elements of a
contract 93 as they would any other contract. A source's breachof-contract action merely asks a court to assess damages against
a media entity for injuring the source by breaking a voluntary
89. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Because confidentiality
agreements assist the press in gathering news and because courts consider reporter's privilege cases to be newsgathering cases, it may be tempting to view
breach of reporter-source agreements as a newsgathering problem. The gravamen of the action, however, is injury through publication, not through newsgathering. The defamation analogy is useful. A defamation claim is not a
newsgathering case merely because the plaintiff alleges that the defendant
was careless in gathering news, causing the subsequent published report to be
false; the focus of the action is on publication. Similarly, the wrong that a confidential source in a breach of contract case alleges is publication, not gathering of confidential information. In contrast, the wrong alleged in a claim for
intrusion of privacy is tortious newsgathering activity. See supra note 45. Indeed, the intrusion tort itself is committed exclusively during newsgathering,
even though publication may follow. See Hill, Defamation and Privacy
Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1279 (1976). Some
courts allow intrusion plaintiffs to recover additional damages flowing from
the incidental publication, but make clear that the intrusion tort itself is a
newsgathering claim. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 244, 250 (9th
Cir. 1971).
90. See supra notes 1, 61-65 and accompanying text.
91. The American Newspaper Guild's Code of Ethics states: "Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential information in court or before judicial or investigative bodies." AmERICAN
NEWSPAPER GUILD, CODE OF ETHICS, quoted in Comment, supra note 64, at 418
n.7. See also supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing reasons journalists protect their confidential sources).
92. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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agreement. Nevertheless, many members of the press believe

that such actions violate the first amendment because they penalize the media for providing truthful and newsworthy information to the public. 94 When a media entity chooses to elevate
the value of publishing newsworthy information 95 above the
need to shield its sources, 9 6 the first amendment should9 7at least
limit absolute enforcement of pure contract principles.
In addition, because many reporter-source agreements are
indefinite and vague, 98 a contract action for sources potentially

conflicts with the Supreme Court's admonition that uncertainty
about potential liability be kept to a minimum in the first
amendment area.99 Uncertainty gives rise to self-censorship and
inhibits the exercise of first amendment freedoms. 0 0 Moreover, imprecision and the oral nature of many confidentiality
agreements raise serious problems of proof.1°1 The evidence in
94. Langley & Levine, supra note 13, at 24. The Supreme Court has indicated that the press operates at its zenith when publishing truthful information. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1974).
95. A strong journalistic ethic militates against suppression of newsworthy information. See Culbertson, Leaks-A Dilemma for Editors as Well
as Officials, 57 JOURNALISM Q. 402, 403 (1980); American Society of Newspaper
Editors, Statement of Principles, quoted in Simon, Libel as Malpractice:News
Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 473-74 n.121
(1984) (stating that the primary purpose of gathering and distributing news
and opinion is to serve the general welfare by informing the people); see also
supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for Constitution's protection of press).
96. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
97. Ronald Dworkin has noted that the first amendment may restrict contracts giving up the right to speak, especially if the press is involved, because
speakers may be acting not just for their own, but for the public's, benefit. See
R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 395-97 (1985).
98. See Blasi, supra note 53, at 284. Blasi noted that some confidentiality
agreements involving sophisticated sources are more explicit, but these are the
exception rather than the rule. Id at 243. Two factors may account for the
imprecise nature of confidentiality agreements. First, sources and reporters
have based these agreements on trust, deeming a reporter's promise sufficient
to ensure confidentiality. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. Second, journalists often work under time constraints that make it impracticable
for them to define agreements with sources precisely.
99. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
100. The development of constitutional rules in the defamation field is
based partly on this concern. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
101. A related problem posed by the oral nature of many such agreements
is the statute of frauds. In many states, a statute of frauds provision requires
contracts that cannot be performed within one year to be written. A. MUELLER, A. ROsErT & G. LOPEZ, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATIONS 224 (3d ed.
1983). The trial judge in Cohen held that the confidentiality contract at issue
there satisfied the statute of frauds because it could be performed in less than
a year, and because one side, the source, already had fully performed. Cohen
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a suit alleging a violation of such an agreement often could consist of the source's word against the reporter's. The potential
for expensive and sometimes vexatious litigation1 0 2 about the
existence and terms of such agreements could chill editorial decision-making and lead to the kind of self-censorship that is in10 3
consistent with the first amendment.
One solution to these tensions would be for the press never
to promise confidentiality. This solution would eliminate the
problem of definiteness in the terms of such agreements. It
also assures that editors would not be forced to choose between
publishing newsworthy information and honoring reporters'
agreements. Such a solution, however, would hinder the press
in performing its core functions of informing the public and
checking the government. 0 4 Journalists now depend heavily
on confidential informants to gather news, 10 5 and the information obtained often forms the basis for major news pieces that
enable members of the public to exercise their sovereignty
06
rights as citizens.
Another solution to the tensions created by sources contract actions would be for courts to hold that the first amendment shields the press from any liability. Because the function
of the media is to publish information, sources arguably assume
the risk that journalists will disclose more information than
sources intend. 10 7 This solution fails to recognize the important
role that legally enforceable agreements play in allowing indiv. Cowles Media Co., 14 Media L. Rep. 1460, 1462 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1988) (Knoll,
J., denying motion for summary judgment).
102. An example of vexatious litigation directed against the media is a new
breed of libel action intended to harass, punish, and intimidate the media
rather than to seek compensation for actual injury. See Kirtley, Discovery in
Libel Cases Involving Confidential Sources and Non-Confidential Information, 90 DICK. L. REV. 641, 643 (1986); R. Bezanson, G. Cranberg& J. Soloski,
Libel and the Press: Setting the Record Straight, Silha Lecture at the University of Minnesota, May 15, 1985, reprintedin SILHA CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
MEDIA ETHICS AND LAW, UNIV. OF MINN., PUBLICATION No. 85061 (1985). A
source contract action could raise similar problems; cf. supra note 98 (discussing imprecise nature of most confidentiality agreements).
103. In the field of defamation, for example, the potential cost of even defending libel suits has caused some publishers to stop investigating certain
high-risk stories or to decline to publish them. Picard, Litigation Costs and
Self-Censorship, L.A. Daily, June 19, 1981, at s1S.
104. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
106. See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (1981).
107. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: the ConstitutionalRight to a
Confidential Relationship,80 YALE L. REv. 317, 342 (1970).
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viduals to rely on the promises of others.10 8 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has rejected an absolutist position in protecting
first amendment values,10 9 choosing instead to balance the interests protected by common-law causes of action against first
amendment interests.11 0 Giving the press unlimited power to
abrogate legitimate agreements, without regard to the harm
such abrogation may cause sources, leaves important interests
unprotected and tips the balance too far in favor of free press
interests.31 1
When new causes of action or new fact situations involving
traditional causes of action chill the exercise of first amendment functions, courts must respond with a standard that reconciles the competing interests. 12 Normally, requiring
members of society to keep their promises is unobjectionable.
Similarly, requiring the press to honor its contractual under108. This solution also ignores the media's heavy reliance on confidential
agreements in gathering news. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
109.

M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.01, at 2-3 (1984). See,

e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (noting that "absolute
protection for the communications media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of defamation"); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (balancing private interest in expression against state
interest in preventing subversion).
110. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 107, 126 (1959) (stating
that "[w]here First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation, resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of
the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown"); cf. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (finding that tension necessarily exists between need for vigorous press and legitimate interest in redressing
wrongful injury, which must be resolved by reconciling of interests).
111. Professor Alfred Hill considered the closely analogous problem of contracts restricting an author's ability to publish confidential information and
concluded that courts must balance the interests protected by such contracts
against first amendment considerations. See Hill, supra note 89, at 1294, 129899. Professor Hill did not examine how courts should resolve the competing
interests, noting that "[t]he extent to which otherwise valid obligations of secrecy may be enforced consistently with the first amendment is a major issue
that will not be examined in this Article." Id. at 1294. Hill seemed to lean toward a standard similar to that proposed in this Note, however, remarking
that liability may depend on whether "the breach by the author is a particularly egregious one." Id. at 1299.
112. Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974)
(stating that nontraditional restraints on publishing can be subject to constitutional standards); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 210,
127 P.2d 577, 579 (1942) (stating that "[n]ew sets of facts are continually arising
to which accepted legal principles must be applied, and the novelty of the factual situation is not an unscalable barrier to such application of the law"); Van
Alstyne, supra note 47, at 817-19 (arguing courts must be vigilant in applying
heightened constitutional standards to new causes of action that threaten first
amendment values).
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takings, or to follow generally applicable laws such as those
regulating labor 13 or antitrust practices, 114 is rarely thought to
present a first amendment problem. 1 5 But when enforcement
of contracts abridges core press functions-such as informing
first
the public and acting as a check on the government-the
11 6
limitations.
some
impose
should
amendment
Modern defamation law provides a useful analogy. There
is nothing inherently objectionable about punishing speakers
for uttering defamatory falsehoods that injure the reputation of
others. But because the punishment of false defamatory speech
may threaten to chill publication of truthful, newsworthy information, the first amendment limits application of defamation
law. As in other first amendment areas, the Supreme Court
has adopted standards that balance the interests protected by
defamation law and the first amendment interest in robust
117
debate.
Similarly, to resolve the tension between sources' expectations of confidentiality and the interests of the press in freedom
from litigation caused by indefinite agreements and in the ability to publish newsworthy information, courts should balance
the conflicting interests. 1 8 As in the area of defamation, courts
113. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (finding that
first amendment does not insulate press from operation of National Labor Relations Act).
114. See Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268, 281 (1934) (applying provisions of Sherman Act to press
entity without discussing first amendment).
115. Justice Harlan has illustrated this point by noting that if a reporter
racing to cover a story negligently runs down a pedestrian, his employer cannot escape tort liability by invoking the first amendment. See Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 67 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132 (stating that "the publisher of a newspaper has no
special immunity from the application of the general laws").
116. The distinction between regulations impinging on core press functions
and those imposing merely incidental burdens is an important one. Requiring
that the media adhere to fair labor practices or honor their contractual obligations to pay their light bills is unobjectionable because these requirements do
not directly affect the media's checking and publication functions; they are
merely incidental burdens. In contrast, courts have abrogated common-law
tort principles in the defamation and privacy areas because such causes of action threaten the core first amendment functions of the press. See supra notes
23-29 and accompanying text. Similarly, members of the press claim a qualified exemption from standard evidentiary rules when protecting confidential
sources because a nexus exists between newsgathering and the core publication function of the press. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
118. Neither pure application of common-law contract rules nor shielding
the press from all liability under the first amendment achieves an adequate
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should graft a constitutional standard onto common-law contract rules for cases in which confidential sources sue the media. To develop such a standard, courts must consider the
interests served by a such a cause of action, and how that action
threatens first amendment values.
B.

CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING A PROPER STANDARD

Any helpful standard for balancing interests in source contract cases must define the conditions under which plaintiffs
will recover and the conditions under which media defendants
should be exempt from liability. In developing a standard,
courts must balance a state's interest in enforcing its commonlaw contract rules for the benefit of news sources against the
potential abridgment of interests protected by the free press
clause of the first amendment.1 19 Because a constitutional dimension is involved, courts should tilt the balance towards pro120
tection of first amendment interests.
Apart from any contractual rights, sources legitimately expect that the press will honor promises of confidentiality. Fortunately, institutional pressures on the press to keep their
promises provide a good deal of assurance that the press will
uphold these agreements. 21 These pressures, however, are not
enough fully to protect sources. Under some circumstances in
which press entities abrogate legitimate agreements, sources
should be able to recover damages for their resulting injuries.
Government enforcement of contract law 22 promotes socibalance of interests. Cf. supra notes 88-111 and accompanying text (discussing
need to balance interests).
For the first amendment to apply, there must of course be state action. As
in the case of tort claims such as defamation, the state action occurs through
judicial enforcement of the rights of the parties. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). Contra Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., No. C8-882631, sl. op. at 8 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1989) (holding no state action in enforcing contract law).
119. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
935, 936-38 (1968); see, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959)
("Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation, resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances
shown.").
120. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (Cir. D.C. 1968).
121. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
122. Freedom to contract is also a cherished and constitutionally recognized ideal. Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189,
1193 (D. Mass. 1985) (Keeton, J.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,855 F.2d 888
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ety's interest in achieving stable relationships by allowing individuals to rely on others' promises 123 and by compensating
parties when agreements are breached. In the newsgathering
context, a source may rely more readily on a reporter's promise
of confidentiality if the source knows that a remedy for breach
exists, 124 and that in the event the press entity breaches the
agreement, a contract action will provide damages for injury
flowing from the breach. 125 The harm to a source from breach
will vary greatly, but likely will depend on the reason the
source sought confidentiality in the first place. 126 The greater
the interest the source sought to protect by requesting confidentiality, the larger is the likely harm from breach.
(1st Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 869 (1989). This freedom lies at the
heart of personal autonomy, allowing individuals to order business and personal affairs and to protect interests they deem important. See H. HUNTER,
supra note 79, at §§ 1-1, 1-2.
123. Roscoe Pound wrote that it is "a jural postulate of civilized society"
that people "be able to assume that those with whom they deal... will carry
out their undertakings.... ." R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
or LAW 133 (1954).
124. Although it is impossible to generalize about why sources choose to
disclose information, it is fair to say that at least some sources may be more
willing to disclose information on a confidential basis knowing that they have
a legal remedy if a press entity breaks its promise. Johnson, "Punishing the
Press," Minn. L. J., Sept. 1988, at 20, col. I (quoting attorney Elliot C. Rothenberg); cf Blasi, supra note 53, at 267 (noting that one cannot conclude that
threat of reporter being subpoenaed certainly causes "drying up" of sources
because many factors affect reasons sources reveal information); Osborne,
supra note 52, at 75 (stating it is virtually impossible to ascertain reasons why
some sources are reluctant to provide information).
125. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of contract damages). A complete discussion of damages is beyond the scope of this
Note. One observation, however, is in order. Damages for emotional distress
may be available in these cases, although they are unavailable in other contract cases, because breaches of confidentiality contracts foreseeably can cause
emotional distress as well as pecuniary loss. Cf. Huskey v. NBC, Inc., 632 F.
Supp. 1282, 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("By their very nature, contracts not to invade
privacy are contracts whose breach may reasonably be expected to cause emotional disturbance").
126. Sources who bargain for confidentiality often seek to protect important interests by remaining anonymous. Their careers, their status in the community, or even their lives may be at risk when they disclose information.
Foreman, supra note 58, at 27.
Everyone-has an interest in controlling what others know about him or
her and how they receive that information. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 32-36 (1967). The issues raised by breach-of-confidentiality contract
actions thus recall the tension between the right to keep intimate facts private
and the public's "right to know" that arises in an action for disclosure of private facts. See supra note 45; Bezanson, Public Disclosures as News: Injunctive Relief and Newsworthiness in Privacy Actions Involving the Press, 64
IOWA L. REV. 1061, 1078-79 (1979).
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The countervailing interest at stake whenever press freedoms are threatened is the constitutionally recognized role of
the press in informing the public, checking the government,
and promoting individual self-expression. 127 As the Supreme
Court's decisions in the defamation and privacy areas illustrate,
courts must identify the ways in which particular common-law
128
actions abridge those interests.
A source's contract cause of action threatens to abridge
free press interests in several ways. The indefinite nature of
confidentiality agreements 12 9 could leave the press vulnerable
to suits based upon little more than a source's word against a
reporter's. 130 In addition, strict contract liability chills the freedom of the media to exercise complete editorial discretion to
publish newsworthy information.
Under the basic contract model, each party negotiates
terms, often laboriously, until the two reach a mutual understanding. There are exceptions to the paradigm, but courts are
accustomed to settling disputes with the assistance of written
documentation and other evidence of negotiations.
The hurried nature of the newsgathering process, however,
normally precludes a reporter and a source from generating
such extensive documentation. Confidentiality agreements are
31
nearly always oral and frequently are vague and imprecise.'
A factual determination by a court as to whether a confidentiality agreement in fact exists, and as to what the agreement's
terms are, may turn on nothing more than the recollections of
the parties. 132 Such cases create difficult issues for factfinders
and would subject the press to protracted and expensive
133
litigation.
127.
128.
129.

See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3547 and accompanying text.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.

130. Cf.Note, Breach of Confidence:An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1426, 1462 (1982) (stating that tort of breach of confidence is not applicable in
reporter-source context because of difficulty in determining what promises reporter made).
131. See supra note 98 and accompanying text,
132. A related problem is contract law's allowance of courts to fill the gaps
that parties leave in agreements. This power works well in a commercial setting, where most issues are laboriously negotiated and trade usage and custom
provide guidelines for filling in implied terms. See generally Bayles, Introduction: The Purposes of ContractLaw, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 616, 642-43 (1983) (noting courts rely on custom to imply contract terms). The imprecise nature of
confidentiality contracts, however, creates great uncertainty about how judges
will fill in gaps in such contracts.
133. The use of contract law in other areas of the reporter-source relation-
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Members of the Supreme Court have stated that the very
possibility of engaging in protracted litigation may impermissibly chill the exercise of first amendment rights. 134 Significantly, one newspaper recently prevented distribution of an
entire section after a source claimed that publication of a story
would violate her confidentiality agreement with a reporter.
Because the newspaper's editors could not verify whether this
agreement in fact existed, they decided not to publish the story
135
rather than to risk litigation.
The Supreme Court consistently has recognized that editors have wide latitude in deciding what to publish. 136 Information about an individual that is embarrassing, 137 causes extreme
emotional distress, 13 or is false and defamatory but published
without the requisite degree of fault 139 enjoys constitutional
protection. The first amendment imposes such limits on press
liability to enable the press to perform its constitutionally rec140
ognized roles.
When a media entity knowingly publishes information it
has promised to keep confidential, it often will have made an
ship also could create new legal problems for the press. For instance, a reporter who tells a source that he wants to get the source's side of a story to
"balance the piece" could risk a breach of contract suit if the published story
omits the source's statements. The source could claim that he gave the reporter information in exchange for a promise that the story would quote the
source. Even worse, a source could sue for breach of contract based on the reporter's failure to achieve balance even if the story did quote the source. The
source could allege that the reporter promised to achieve balance, not merely
to quote the source. Such suits would require that a court engage in a potentially chilling, content-based inquiry to determine if the piece was or was not
balanced. The newspaper defendants in Cohen raised the latter scenario as a
likely result of allowing confidential sources to bring common-law breach-ofcontract actions. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 7, at 5.
134. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (plurality
opinion); id. at 82 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. See supra note 16.
136. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974) ("It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this
crucial process [of editing] can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press...").
137. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn., 420 U.S. 469, 494-97 (1975) (holding press is absolutely privileged to report embarrassing facts contained in
public records about private persons).
138. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S.Ct. 876, 882 (1988) (applying
actual malice standard to claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
139. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding public official plaintiff must prove actual malice to recover for
defamation).
140. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
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editorial decision that the value of making the information public outweighs the value of upholding its agreements. 141 When a
source sues for breach of contract, the source asks a court to
impose absolute liability on the press entity for its editorial decision without regard to the circumstances that led to breach.
In a normal commercial setting, such liability would be unobjectionable.L42 Normal common-law rules must be modified,
143
however, if free speech and free press interests are present.
The strong ethic of protecting anonymous sources influences editorial decisions regarding publication in violation of
confidentiality agreements. 144 Important reasons therefore
may motivate a decision to breach such an agreement. Events
may have changed dramatically since a press entity promised
anonymity. 145 Alternatively, the press entity may discover that
the source lied, 1 46 making the source's identity and motive

themselves newsworthy. In addition, the information offered
by the source may implicate the source in a criminal investigation, 47 or in other ways may have taken on a newsworthiness
not anticipated when the promise of confidentiality was
made. 48 Such reasons explain why the press chooses to breach
a promise of confidentiality.
An analysis of the interests at stake is necessary to the formulation of an appropriate standard. Sources are most justified
in pursuing claims arising from substantial injury to the interests their requests for confidentiality are intended to protect.
The press, on the other hand, has legitimate interests in avoiding disputes over ambiguous and indefinite confidentiality
agreements, and in being able to publish information that is extraordinarily newsworthy. Under an optimum standard for
claims of breach, liability would arise if a definite agreement
141. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
142. Under traditional contract doctrine, the defendant's motive for
breaching a contract is not relevant. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
144. In the Cohen case, discussed at notes 8-12 and accompanying text,
supra,the editors of a newspaper debated whether to disclose the identity of a
confidential source for more than five hours before reaching a decision. See
Defendants' Brief, supra note 7, at 23-25.
145. For example, the information may implicate national security or bear
on an important political contest. Investigative reporter Bob Woodward contends that the death of the source abrogates any agreement between the
source and the reporter. Langley & Levine, supra note 13, at 22.
146. Id.; see also supra note 76 (discussing instances in which press decided
disclosure of confidential information was in public interest).
147. See supra note 76.
148. For two examples of such changed circumstances, see id.
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existed and a press entity breached an agreement in a particularly egregious manner without regard for the interests and
rights of the source. As in other areas in which first amendment free press interests are present, courts should apply a
constitutional standard under which a defendant must be found
to have acted with some degree of fault to be held liable. 149
III.

THE PROPOSED STANDARD AND HOW COURTS
SHOULD APPLY IT

A two-part standard that addresses both the definiteness' 5 0
and the newsworthiness concerns' 5 ' of the press offers the best
reconciliation of the competing interests. This section proposes
such a standard, discusses this standard's protection of the competing interests, suggests how courts should apply the standard,
and addresses possible criticisms of the standard.
A.

THE PROPOSED STANDARD

Under the first prong of the standard, courts should require source plaintiffs to produce clear and convincing evidence 152 that a confidentiality agreement existed and that a
media entity breached the agreement by publishing information
in violation of its terms.
This prong parallels the Supreme Court's holdings in the
defamation area, which require that public figure plaintiffs
prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendants acted
with actual malice. 153 A heightened burden of proof is necessary to preserve first amendment values.'- 4 Application of a
clear and convincing standard of proof is especially appropriate
in source contract causes of action, because a media defendant
faces difficulty in refuting a source's claim that confidentiality
149. See Hill, supra note 89, at 1254-55 ("The first amendment must be
deemed generally to preclude imposition of liability upon the media for activities peculiar to their media functions except upon a finding of fault"); see also
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 423-24, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342,
351 (1983) (same).
150. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
151. Newsworthiness concerns include the interest of the press in deciding
which information to publish as well as the inherent newsworthiness of the
information to be published. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
152. Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof,
demanding more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 271
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
154. Id.
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was promised. 55 This prong of the proposed standard limits
the potential for frivolous and vexatious suits in which a source
makes only vague allegations and the media entity involved denies that it promised confidentiality or disputes key terms of an
15 6
alleged confidentiality agreement.
Assuming the source plaintiff can prove the existence and
breach of the agreement with clear and convincing evidence,
courts further should require that the plaintiff prove the media
entity breached the agreement with reckless disregard for the
source's interests in seeing the promise of confidentiality
157
honored.
The second prong of the proposed standard resembles the
New York Times fault standard for public figure defamation
15
cases because it requires a showing of reckless disregard.
Like the Times rule, the proposed standard abrogates the common-law, which imposed strict liability, by requiring a showing
of fault on the part of a media defendant before a court can impose liability. The proposed standard, however, is not intended
155. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. One possible alternative to a constitutional standard that raises the burden of proof would be to
employ the common-law contract rule that courts will enforce only agreements that are certain. That rule, however, inadequately protects first amendment interests. Courts are reluctant to declare agreements void for
uncertainty until the parties have had an opportunity to present all relevant
evidence, and will find a contract void for indefiniteness only as a last resort.
Wedtke Realty Corp. v. Karanas, 286 A.D. 339, 143 N.Y.S.2d 198, aff'd, 309
N.Y. 904, 131 N.E.2d 579 (1955). Such a protracted factfinding process is incompatible with first amendment interests. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
156. In such cases, the media defendant almost always would prevail on a
motion for summary judgment. A court would be required to apply the clear
and convincing standard in evaluating the summary judgment motion. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). In a "swearing contest" involving only the recollections of a reporter and a source, a plaintiff
would be unable to meet the clear and convincing standard. The consequence
may be that meritorious claims are precluded because the plaintiff lacks corroborating evidence, but such a result is not unique. Other procedural safeguards employed to protect first amendment values produce a similar result.
See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (stating
that requiring defamation plaintiffs to prove falsity of publication may cause
some otherwise meritorious claims to fail, although they would have succeeded
had burden been on defendant to prove speech was truthful).
157. Recklessness denotes needless and wanton indifference to consequences. Dale & Dale, Full Court Press: The Imperial Judiciaryvs. the Paranoid Press, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 241, 280 (1980).
158. The Times standard is employed in public figure defamation cases and
has been extended to similar common-law actions seeking compensation for
injury caused by publication. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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to be a blind application of the Times rule.159 Although New
York Times and its progeny generally illustrate the weight
courts should give the competing interests involved in such
cases, 160 the nature of the contract cause of action and of the
competing interests to be balanced preclude simple application
of the New York Times standard.1 6 1 The meaning of reckless
disregardin this context necessarily differs from its meaning in
162
the defamation context.
The reckless disregard part of the proposed standard focuses on the harm to the source that flows from the breach of a
confidentiality agreement. To impose liability under this standard, a factfinder must find that the media defendant published
the information in violation of the confidentiality agreement
without giving due deference to the source's rights. This approach requires balancing of the particular interests at stake in
a given case. Relevant considerations in determining the existence of recklessness include the extent of a media defendant's
knowledge of the reasons why a source requested confidentiality, the defendant's reason for publishing the specific information, and the newsworthiness of that information. Such
considerations are significant because "reckless disregard" is a
standard of culpability that has meaning only when the defend159. Cf Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967) (stating that application
of New York Times standard to false light privacy tort is not blind
application).
160. R. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 11.01 [a]-[b], at 114.5.
161. Professor Smolla forcefully argues that courts cannot apply the New
York Times standard blindly to other causes of action. Discussing the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, he argues that it is "logically impossible to simply lift the New York Times formulation out of the context of
defamation and apply it literally to the tort of infliction of emotional distress
because the relationship between the publisher's conduct and the risk encompassed by the emotional distress tort is different in kind from the relationship
between the conduct and the risk at stake in defamation." See R. SMOLLA,
supra note 41, § 11.01[2][b], at 11-4.4 to .5. The Court's application of New York
Times to the intentional infliction cause of action in Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell is not a pure application of New York Times, however; its "relational
terms" must mean something different from their meaning in the defamation
context. See infra note 163 (explaining Professor Smolla's concept of "relational terms"); supra note 46 (citing Hustler decision).
162. See Hill, supra note 89, at 1254-55. Professor Hill argues that the first
amendment precludes imposition of liability for activities peculiar to the media
function of the press unless fault is shown. Id
The type of scienter found in defamation law is not present in private
facts disclosure cases, however, because the disclosure itself is willful. Courts
therefore must formulate a different standard of fault for those cases, and for
source disclosure cases where a breach of contract is alleged. See supra note
160-61 and accompanying text.
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163
ant's conduct is measured against competing considerations.

B.

How THE PROPOSED STANDARD PROTECTS
THE COMPETING INTERESTS

The proposed standard strikes a balance between strict liability for contract breaches and absolute protection for the
press. In essence, it allows liability for particularly egregious
breaches, but protects the press from the chilling effects that
imposing strict liability for breaches of confidentiality contracts
would create.
Requiring that a source prove the terms of an alleged
agreement with clear and convincing evidence, and that the
press recklessly disregarded the source's rights in breaching
such an agreement, will provide sources with a strong incentive
carefully to negotiate the terms of confidentiality agreements.' 64 Sources also will have an incentive to make certain
that reporters understand the consequences of breaching such
agreements. 165 So long as a journalist knows why the source
seeks confidentiality, 6 6 and understands the likely harm to the
source from breach, a court is likely to impose liability for such
163. Professor Smolla notes that "[tlerms describing levels of fault have no
meaning in the abstract. The terms 'intentional,' 'reckless,' and 'negligent' are
always relational; they make sense only as descriptions of relations between
an actor's conduct and specific risks." R. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 11.01 [2]b1,
at 11-4.4.
For example, speeding through a busy residential neighborhood could
show reckless disregard for the rights of others. Such conduct may not be
reckless, however, when the driver is rushing a dying person to the hospital.
Similarly, when the press breaches a confidentiality agreement, the newsworthiness of the information may be so great as to support a finding that the
press was not reckless.
164. Putting the burden on sources makes sense because they know best
the extent of the interests they seek to protect. Indeed, some sources already
operate in this fashion. See Blasi, supra note 53, at 242-43 (noting that government whistle blowers, who are especially vulnerable to reprisals, tend to use
care in negotiating confidentiality and require an explicit understanding of the
agreement).
165. This consequence also may promote the desirable goal of making reporters more careful in promising confidentiality.
166. The journalist may not know the precise reasons why a source requests confidentiality, and the source need not always disclose these reasons to
the reporter. Reporters should be expected to make reasonable inferences
from the circumstances and their knowledge of the nature of the reportersource relationship. For instance, an employee in the Pentagon who gives a
reporter information on cost overruns on condition of anonymity obviously
risks being fired, and knowledge of that fact should be imputed to a journalist
who accepts a tip from such an employee.
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a breach.167 The standard also applies to sources with little at
stake, however; a media entity is not absolutely free to breach
an agreement just because a source has little to lose from
breach. 168 The proposed standard nonetheless recognizes that
the sources requiring the most state protection generally are
169
the ones with the most to lose from a breach.
When a media entity publishes highly newsworthy information, however, the factfinder might find that recklessness
does not exist, even if a journalist knew that disclosure could
cause a source great harm.17 0 There is nothing novel in this approach. It recognizes that a recklessness standard requires a
factfinder to weigh the utility of the defendant's
conduct
17 1
against the foreseeable harm to the plaintiff.
Under the proposed standard, when a media entity publishes information it believes is not covered by a confidentiality
agreement, the media entity need not fear liability unless a
source can show with clear and convincing evidence that the
167. This outcome is more likely because the second prong of the standard
focuses on the conduct of the media defendant when it decided to abrogate the
agreement.
168. The standard recognizes that all sources have legitimate expectations
that confidentiality contracts will be honored and that the press should not be
free recklessly to disregard sources' rights. As an example, suppose a reporter
is doing a story on rieighborhood crime-watch programs. The reporter grants
confidentiality to a member of the neighborhood who criticizes the program as
"worthless and ineffective." The most the source risks is that neighbors might
view the source as uncooperative or cranky. If the media entity decides that
the article reads better with the confidential source named and breaches the
agreement on that ground alone, however, there is a good case for liability.
169. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-44 (1974) (noting that
extent of state protection of interests depends on character of those interests).
170. For example, suppose that a source gave certain information about an
air force jet fighter to a reporter as background. If the confidential information proves that the plane has a tendency to crash and the reporter cannot obtain this information from another source, the press may be justified in
breaching the agreement and publishing the information.
171. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. The recklessness standard
thus requires courts to engage in some ad hoc balancing in each particular
case. Cf. Note, Media Liabilityfor PhysicalInjury Resulting from the Negligent Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1193, 1223-24 (1988) (noting that application of negligence theory in speech area necessarily involves ad hoc balancing).
The proposed standard, however, is not an ad hoc balancing standard. Professor Nimmer explains that heightened constitutional standards such as the New
York Times standard are definitional balancing standards. In developing the
proposed standard, plaintiffs' rights and first amendment interests are balanced in the abstract, not in light of a particular case. See M. NIMMER, supra
note 109, § 2.03. In applying the standard to the facts of a particular case, however, courts must engage in ad hoc balancing of the media defendant's conduct
against the asserted rights of the plaintiff source.
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media entity had promised not to publish the information. 7 2 If
the reporter denies such a promise' and no corroborating evishould
dence to support the source's allegation exists, a court
73
grant summary judgment to the media defendant.
The standard also gives the media "breathing space" to
make editorial decisions about when the public interest demands that they breach a confidentiality agreement. The proposed standard imposes a duty on the media to pay special
attention to the interests of the source in making these decisions. The press, however, is not given the final say about
whether it has struck the correct balance of interests. As in
other areas of the law, the judiciary must be the final arbiter of
conflicting rights.
C.

APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD TO THE COHEN
CASE

In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,1 74 the parties did not dispute
the terms of the confidentiality agreement. 175 Thus, under the
proposed standard, the plaintiff would have had no problem
proving the terms by clear and convincing evidence. The second prong of the standard therefore would determine the outcome of the case.
Whether the newspapers breached the agreement in reckless disregard of the rights of the source depends on three factors: the defendant's knowledge of the likely harm to the
source flowing from publication, the newsworthiness of the information published, and the proffered reasons for disclosure.
The media defendants in Cohen argued that the newsworthiness of the source's identity outweighed their obligation to
honor their promise of confidentiality. 176 In addition, they argued that Cohen hid key information from the reporters when
he extracted a promise of confidentiality. 177 Cohen argued that
172. For instance, if the reporter's subpoenaed notes showed that the reporter granted confidentiality, the source would meet the burden of proof.
Another example of evidence that would satisfy the burden is the production
of eyewitnesses who heard the reporter promise confidentiality.
173. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
174. 14 Media L. Rep. 1460 (BNA) (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1988), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part,No. C8-88-2631, sl. op. at 10 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1989).
175. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 7, at 20-21.
176. The newspapers argued that the only way to place the story in context
was to identify Cohen as the source and to explain that his reason for offering
the information about the opposing candidate was to smear her just before the
election. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 7, at 28-29.
177. See supra note 7.
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the newspapers knew that disclosing his identity would expose
him to ridicule and that his resulting loss of employment was
foreseeable. 178 In addition, Cohen contended that the defendants could have accomplished their objective of informing the
public by identifying the source of the information as "a Republican party activist," or a similar tag.179
The Cohen facts would present a difficult question for the
factfinder under this Note's proposed standard, because they
constitute a truly "hard case"' 8 0 in which strong evidence supports both sides. The newspapers' decision not to publish a
story that simply attributed Cohen's information to "a Republican party activist" or other such tag conveying the message that
the tip was a political smear arguably suggests reckless disregard for Cohen's rights. On the other hand, Cohen was rather
well known in the community and the newsworthiness of his
specific identity might persuade a jury that the defendants had
not acted with reckless disregard.
The proposed standard does not dictate a particular result
in Cohen, but it does provide a framework for analysis that
takes into account the competing interests on both sides. The
standard recognizes that the presence of important first amendment values mandates that a federal constitutional standard
limit the common law of contracts when a source sues the press
for breach of a confidentiality agreement.
D.

A RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF THE STANDARD

The proposed standard protects the media from the chilling
effects of litigation over imprecise agreements and allows some
editorial freedom to breach agreements where the media does
not recklessly ignore the harm that will flow to the source.
The freedom to disclose confidential information appears at
first blush contrary to the newsperson's privilege, which protects the press from forced disclosure of its sources."' The different considerations involved in a source contract suit,
however, make the proposed standard perfectly compatible
82
with the newsperson's privilege.
178. Cohen, 14 Media L. Rep. at 1463.
179. 1&
180. This Note hypothesizes some "easy" cases under the proposed standard. See supra notes 145, 156, 163, 166, 168, 170.
181. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. As media attorney
Floyd Abrams noted: "It's not easy to say we can't reveal a confidential source
in one case but can in another." Langley & Levine, supra note 13, at 24.
182. Because of the first amendment newsgathering value involved, courts
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A newsperson's privilege protects the media's newsgathering function 8 3 by limiting forced source disclosures in judicial
proceedings. Forced disclosures, however, do not directly affect
the media's core function of publication. In contrast, a state's
enforcement of a confidentiality agreement through a source's
breach-of-contract suit directly punishes the press for an editorial decision to publish 8 4. Were publication itself not an issue,
little argument could be made for applying a constitutional
standard of protection in favor of a press entity in a breach-ofcontract suit.
Moreover, giving the press some protection against source
contract suits should not cause sources to become generally less
willing to speak to journalists. 8 5 The present system allows
courts in judicial proceedings to order the press to disclose confidential sources when the courts determine that disclosure is
in the interest of justice. 8 6 Thus, sources already are exposed
to disclosure in the course of judicial proceedings, 8 7 and evidently are not thereby deterred from communicating with the
press.
The proposed standard alters the common-law contract
framework in two ways for source breach-of-contract suits.
The standard imposes on plaintiffs a heavier burden of proof,
because they must prove the existence and terms of the alleged
generally apply a balancing standard to determine whether the media in a particular case should be required to divulge a confidential source. The proposed
standard also balances factors bearing on whether the media should be held
liable for a contract breach. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 89.
185. Strong institutional pressures continue to discourage the press from
breaching confidentiality agreements. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. In addition, forthright judicial recognition that a promise of confidentiality is a legally enforceable agreement actually may persuade some sources
that they should have less reason to fear speaking with the media.
186. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. Such disclosure can
cause sources injury similar to voluntary publication by the press. Most courts
have disregarded this harm when ordering disclosure, however, holding that
the newsperson's privilege protects only the newsgathering interest of the media, not the interests of the source. See supra note 73.
187. Because the judiciary can abrogate confidentiality agreements, it
would be a perverse result to hold a press entity absolutely liable when, to fulfill its constitutional function of publishing newsworthy information, it abrogates a confidentiality agreement. Government, through the judiciary, could
abrogate reporter-source agreements but would strictly enforce sources' rights
against the press when the press made the same decision. That system, which
would allow no balancing of interests, would cross the line from legitimate enforcement of the laws to invasion of the institutional autonomy of the press.
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contract and that the media defendant breached the agreement
with the requisite degree of fault. This proposal accords with
the judicial trend of devising special rules for narrow classes of
contract cases, 18 8 such as the rule that courts will construe

89
strictly agreements that insulate parties from tort liability
Courts apply such rules as a matter of state common law,
whereas courts would apply the standard proposed by this Note
as a matter of federal constitutional law protecting the first
amendment values at stake.
Furthermore, the common law requires that the plaintiff
prove the existence and terms of a contract with clear and convincing evidence in other contract contexts. When a patient alleges that a physician contracted to guarantee a specific result,
for example, most courts require clear proof of the existence
and terms of the agreement. 190 The rationale for that rule is
analogous to the rationale behind the proposed standard, that
is, to limit the chilling effect on the practice of medicine caused
by recognition of a contract cause of action against doctors.-91
The proposal also abrogates the general practice of imposing contract liability without regard to fault 192 by requiring that
a source plaintiff prove that a media defendant breached a confidentiality contract with reckless disregard for the source's
rights. Common-law exceptions to this rule, however, are not
unusual. The proposed standard thus follows the prevailing
trend of courts to balance interests in interpreting contracts
when important public policies are at stake. 193 Moreover, in
some states that allow punitive damages for contract breaches,
188. Courts and legislatures always have adapted contract rules to meet
new public policy needs. Particular areas of contract law, such as the law of
sales or insurance, grew out of the need for specialized rules to meet specific
circumstances. See L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965); GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 6-7 (1974). Courts long have limited the enforceability of unconscionable contracts and contracts against public policy. E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, §§ 4.28, 5.1.
189. See, e.g., Goyings v. Jack & Ruth Eckerd Found., 403 So. 2d 1144, 1146
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (invalidating exculpatory clause because it did not
state explicity that defendant would be held harmless for injuries resulting
from its negligence).
190. E.g., Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 582-83, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185-86
(1973). (noting some courts have considered refusing to enforce these agreements as violative of public policy, but most courts have taken middle road by
requiring heightened standard of proof); see Annotation, Recovery Against
Physicianon Basis of Breach of Contract to Achieve ParticularResult or Cure,
43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1225-26 (1972).
191. Annotation, supra note 190, at 1225-26.
192. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
193. The proposed standard is in essence a balancing standard between the
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courts apply a similar nonconstitutional standard of reckless
194
disregard of the rights of others as a threshold for recovery.
This kind of fault inquiry thus should pose few practical
problems for courts. 195
In other areas of the law, constitutional rules limit the enforceability of contracts. 19 6 Like the constitutional rule abrogating strict liability for defamatory falsehoods, the proposed
standard alters the common-law contract framework by allowing recovery only to plaintiffs who prove the requisite degree of fault.1 97 The proposed standard applies only in the
narrow class of cases in which a news source sues a media entity for publishing information in violation of a confidentiality
agreement with that source. 198 Grafting a federal constitutional
standard onto contract law recognizes that contract law, like
other areas in which the common law chills press freedoms,
"can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations."199
rights of the source in having the agreement enforced and the competing freepress interests.
194. E.g., Material Handling Indus., Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 391 F. Supp. 977,
981 (E.D. Va. 1975) (noting that standard for awarding punitive damages in
contract action is "malice, bad faith, reckless disregard for the rights of
others"). For variations on that language, see cases cited in C. KAUFMAN,
CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTS: 1984 SUPPLEMENT 302-05.
195. One court has applied a fault standard to a source breach-of-contract
claim. See supra note 14. A California court first ruled that a statute which
on its face did not apply to the breach-of-contract situation should govern a
contract case. See id. The court held that under the statute, the plaintiff had
to show the defendant breached the contract with reckless disregard for the
consequences to the source. See id.
196. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95-96 (1972) (holding that due
process clause limits enforceability of contractual waiver of rights under contract for sale of consumer goods).
197. Normally only tort plaintiffs must prove fault. Courts long have recognized, however, that a contract breach resembles a tort. See Greco v. Kresge
Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 33-34 12 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1938) (noting that "distinction between torts and breaches of contract is, ofttimes, so dim and shadowy that no
clear line of delineation ... may be formulated").
198. In narrow classes of cases, constitutional rules can coexist harmoniously with common-law rules. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (allowing recovery under common-law
defamation rules in narrow category of defamation cases in which plaintiff is
private figure and speech at issue is not of public concern). The proposed standard, which applies constitutional restrictions only in the narrow class of
source breach-of-contract actions, is thus consistent both with the evolution of
contract doctrine and with the Court's treatment of other common-law causes
of action that threaten first amendment values.
199. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); see also
Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal. App. 3d 509, 520-21, 223 Cal.
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CONCLUSION
The press plays an important role in our democratic form
of government, and is given constitutional protection to enable
it to inform the public and to provide a check on the government. Important competing interests of the press and of news
sources clash when sources are allowed to sue the press over alleged breaches of confidentiality agreements. A reconciliation
of those interests points to applying a constitutional standard as
a threshold for recovery by such sources.
The proposed standard requires sources to meet a twopronged test. Sources must prove with clear and convincing evidence the terms of the alleged confidentiality agreement.
Sources then must prove that the media breached that agreement by publishing information with reckless disregard for the
rights of the source. This standard balances the interests of the
source in having courts enforce confidentiality agreements with
the competing first amendment interests of the press.
Michael Dicke

Rptr. 58, 64-65 (1986) (noting that it is not cause of action's name that determines whether constitutional protection attaches, but its effect on constitutionally protected speech).

